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Abstract
In recent years concerns have been growing in the scientific community over the definition of scientific
responsibilities during emergencies, and the legal status of scientists involved in the corresponding decision-making.
It is clear that the legal framework is one of the main elements affecting this issue; however, many factors may affect
both the specific scientific decision-making and the definition of general scientific responsibilities. The situation will
vary depending on the type and scale of emergency, and from place to place, even in the same country. There will be
no such thing as a single, ideal solution.
In the latest El Hierro volcanic crisis many factors have negatively affected the scientific management and have
prevented an adequate definition of scientific responsibility. These factors have been detected and documented by
the authors. They include excessive pressure due to human and economic issues, a poor legal framework with
identifiable deficiencies, an Emergency Plan in which the Volcanic Activity/Alert Level (VAL), Emergency Response
Level (ERL) and Volcanic Traffic Light (VTL) have been too rigidly linked, serious weaknesses in the management and
structure of the Scientific Committee (SC), and more. Even though some of these problems have now been detected
and certain solutions have already been proposed, the slowness and complexity of the bureaucratic processes are
making it difficult to implement solutions.
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Introduction
Currently the assessment of what constitutes success or fail-
ure in crisis management is still very complex and subject
to heated debate (McConnell 2011). However, some vol-
canic crises have been considered obvious failures of man-
agement due to the large number of casualties (Chrètien
and Brousse 1989; De la Cruz-Reyna and Martín Del
Pozzo 2009; Voight 1990) and/or serious economic losses
suffered (Aguirre and Ahearn 2007; Bostok 1978). Even
when the human and economic impact is not so serious,
the management process itself is always extremely com-
plex and demanding for the actors involved in it (Cardona
1997). Conflict situations arise at different levels, gener-
ally between different scientific teams, between scientific
advisers and decision-makers, and between different civil
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and/or military authorities involved, etc. Much has been
published about many of these problems; and measures
to be taken for preventing them have been proposed
(Bignami et al. 2012; Newhall et al. 1999; UNDRO 1985).
In some cases, the mistakes made in the past have led
to the development of extensive networks of volcano
monitoring, and highly-qualified teams of researchers
(Bertolaso et al. 2009; Clay et al. 1999). Moreover, in some
places, the Civil Defense authorities have also acquired
considerable experience in dealing with large-scale emer-
gencies, not only those due to volcanic activity but also to
other types of natural hazard (Spahn et al. 2010).
The non-deterministic behavior of the observed phe-
nomena, as in the case of weather or volcanic eruptions
(Altamura et al. 2011; Doyle et al. 2014b), limits our capac-
ity for forecasting them, even in the short-term, thus
making the management of such natural hazards more
difficult. Therefore, when the hazard they face is threat-
ening a highly-populated area, scientists, Civil Defense
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personnel and politicians must make decisions, in real
time and under uncertainty, in a context of great pres-
sure (Marzocchi et al. 2012). In this context, the way in
which the decision-makers understand the information
they receive is critical because it will affect the decisions
they make (Doyle et al. 2014a; Kreye et al. 2012). Follow-
ing the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) framework, some
methodologies and approaches have been proposed to
manage and reduce the uncertainty, not only from the
point of view of data processing and hazard assessment
(Aspinall and Woo 2014; Marzocchi and Jordan 2014;
Marzocchi et al. 2010; Woo 2008) but also in respect
of risk communication (García et al. 2014a; Potter et al.
2014). The need for awareness and a correct perception of
the risk has also been highlighted (Plattner et al. 2006), as
well as the importance of sustaining a strong cooperative
interaction between all the key parties (scientists, public
officials, stakeholders, news media and general public) to
achieve an effective mitigation of the risks (Tilling 1989).
It is essential, however, that these activities and decisions
should take place within an adequate legal framework.
In the management of emergencies the legal framework
is critical, for structuring the overall response necessary
in the event of a major disaster (Eburn 2011); this frame-
work, however, varies considerably from country to coun-
try, depending onmany factors. In this context, the official
Emergency Plans formulated and adopted are normally
considered to be a legal document, approved often after
a lengthy bureaucratic process, but usually remaining in
force for several years from the initial phases of design,
through various processes of updating and improvement.
The Vesuvius Emergency Plan, for instance, was initi-
ated in 1991, published for the first time in 1995, and
then updated in 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013
(Dipartimento della Protezione Civile 1995, 2013) and has
been widely studied by many authors (Marzocchi et al.
2004; Neri et al. 2008; Ricci et al. 2013; Rolandi 2010;
Solana et al. 2008; Zuccaro et al. 2008) The legal status
of the Plan should give some clear benefits in disaster
management (e.g. in defining the origin and destination
of funding and other resources, assigning responsibilities
for action, promoting the reactive or preventive character
of the emergency plan, etc). On the other hand, how-
ever, operational flexibility in the emergency response
might be reduced by the official Plan, due to the com-
plexity of the legal framework (Dan et al. 2012; Dynes
1994), potential failures or weaknesses detected during an
actual or simulated response to a major incident (Haynes
2006), deficiencies in the definitions of expected hazard
scenarios (Rolandi 2010), and other issues.
It is a difficult, if not impossible, task to modify an
Emergency Plan while an emergency is actually being han-
dled; firstly because of the ongoing responsibilities and
liabilities of crisis management, and secondly because,
depending on the particular legislative framework, a new
bureaucratic process must be initiated. Therefore the
information requirements, the decision-making structure
and many other factors initially incorporated in the Emer-
gency Plan are critical for minimizing future conflicts
or failures in dealing with a particular real emergency.
Although the many unpredictable situations that can arise
during an emergency cannot, by definition, be included in
advance (Hutter 2014), the Emergency Planmust be tested
when a real crisis is not taking place, through simulations
in which drills or exercises can be practiced (Marrero
et al. 2013).
The role and responsibilities of scientists will also vary
from country to country, but sometimes such tasks can
never be clearly specified, especially when scientific work
must be done in contexts of high uncertainty, in places
and areas where risks are high (Marzocchi et al. 2012).
The case of the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009 (Cartlidge
2011; Jordan et al. 2011), has had a great impact in the sci-
entific community, with several significant consequences;
among them is a review of the legal status and limits of the
scientific responsibilities (Altamura et al. 2011; Aspinall
2011; Scolobig et al. 2014). Based on the experience gained
by the authors in the El Hierro volcanic crisis, discussed
in this paper are several relevant factors that could ham-
per the correct definition of scientific responsibility. These
factors include the scientific management of a volcanic
crisis in a context of severe pressure, the management
of the Volcanic Activity/Alert Level (VAL), Emergency
Response Level (ERL) and Volcanic Traffic Light (VTL)
when all these important graduated scales are included
and linked in the Emergency Plan, as well as factors affect-
ing the management of the Scientific Committee (SC).
El Hierro volcanic crisis
The 1971 eruption of the Teneguía volcano (La Palma,
Canary Islands) took place in an almost uninhabited area
(Carracedo et al. 2001), with a very limited impact on
the population (Romero 1990). The hardly-noticed impact
of the eruption of 1971 and the long period of time
elapsed since have resulted in a subjective assumption
of invulnerability (Douglas 1985) among the population
of the Canaries. In 2004, when a new episode of unrest
occurred in Tenerife (García et al. 2006; Martí et al. 2009;
Pérez et al. 2007) no National, Regional or Local Volcanic
Risk Plans existed, and people lacked the perception that
they were living in an active volcanic territory (Dóniz-
Páez et al. 2011). Nevertheless, that seismo-volcanic crisis
in Tenerife led the authorities to put into action some
initiatives aimed at mitigating the volcanic risk; these
included the design of the Regional Emergency Plan,
named PEVOLCA, which was approved in 2010 (BOC
2010), and then the first ever national Spanish Volcanic
Risk Emergency Plan (BOE 2013).
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In July 2011 the latest process of volcanic unrest,
which started in El Hierro (Canary Islands), gave rise to
substantial efforts in emergency management, including
deployment of an official volcano monitoring network
(López et al. 2012), analysis of real-time geophysical data
(García et al. 2014a; Prates et al. 2013), activation of the
recently-approved volcanic emergency plan (PEVOLCA),
deployment of emergency response personnel, reinforce-
ments to communication systems, and other measures.
Since the beginning of the unrest a large volume of magma
has accumulated under the island and successive magma
injection processes have occurred (García et al. 2014b;
García-Yeguas et al. 2014; Hernández et al. 2014). These
processes are characterized by rapid increases in defor-
mation (Prates et al. 2013), as well as by “seismic swarms”
of increasing magnitudes (García et al. 2014b; Ibáñez
et al. 2012). The five most important magma injec-
tion processes occurred in the following periods: 1)
June-October 2011; 2) October-November 2011; 3) June-
August 2012; 4) March - April 2013; and 5) December
2013 - January 2014. These processes of unrest on El
Hierro show a very clear pattern of evolution (García et al.
2014b), which to date has allowed the team of scientists
to forecast the increase and acceleration of activity several
days in advance, before the population perceive it (García
et al. 2014a).
The communication strategies followed under the
PEVOLCA during the El Hierro unrest are illustrated in
Figure 1. PEVOLCA’s stakeholders havemanaged two spe-
cific procedures for communicating with the population
at risk, and both are published in themedia available in the
region (press and TV) as well as on the Canaries Govern-
ment official web site: these are the Volcano Traffic Light
(VTL), with 3 colors indicating the alert status for the
population, following a similar approach to that described
in De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008); and the issue of
Official Statements (OS) to inform about the ongoing vol-
canic and seismic activity. Only in the event of need for
evacuation is a specific evacuation order issued, using the
same available media. In accordance with this strategy, the
scientific groups that comprise the Scientific Committee
communicate their information to the civil authorities,
but not to the public (Figure 1). It must be taken into
account that the OS constitute the only official informa-
tion available that is not strictly scientific. The official
technical information is published on the National Geo-
graphic Institute (IGN) website (http://www.ign.es/ign/
layout/volcaVolcanologia.do).
Discussion
Severe pressure on the scientific decision-making
The decision-making process in high-risk areas is con-
ditioned by many factors; several of the most relevant
are: the type and form in which the information is pro-
vided by scientists, and how well it is understood by
non-scientists (Fearnley 2013; McGuire et al. 2009; Solana
et al. 2008); human and economic factors applicable in
the area (Aguirre and Ahearn 2007; Lane et al. 2003); risk
perception (Haynes et al. 2008b); reputational and simi-
lar intangible costs for individuals and groups (Metzger
et al. 1999); the treatment by the mass media of the nat-
ural phenomena in question (Birkland 1996; Francken
et al. 2012); and previous experiences of similar haz-
ards (Cardona 1997). The combination of many of these
factors sometimes leads to severe pressure on the sci-
entific decision-making process that is patently excessive
and can adversely affect the scientists’ conclusions and
decisions. The scientists involved, therefore, have to take
Figure 1 PEVOLCA’s Communication strategy. The scientific information is made public by the PEVOLCA’s press office.
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into account not only the repercussions for the popula-
tion when, for example, they change the alert level, but
also the pressure exerted by public authorities and offi-
cials in respect of their own decisions (Fearnley 2013),
especially if those authorities are not prepared or will-
ing to deal with the human and economic consequences
of such decisions (Tilling 2011). As has been highlighted
by many authors (Marzocchi et al. 2012; Newhall et al.
1999; Tilling 1989), providing scientific advice in popu-
lated areas during a volcanic crisis involves stress and
pressure, but this situation may be aggravated when
many of the key factors noted above are having nega-
tive effects, as was the case in the El Hierro volcanic
crisis.
The volcanic crisis management in the case of El Hierro
has been affected by two main groups of these relevant
factors. The first comprises several closely interrelated
factors, including human and economic issues, previ-
ous experience of similar hazards, and the treatment by
the mass media of the natural phenomena. The second
group of factors, which also affect the first group, includes
changes in perceptions of the risk, and the type and form
in which the information is provided by the scientists and
how well it is understood by non-scientists.
Traditionally, the Canary Islands are considered a “sun,
sand and sea” tourism destination (Garín-Munõz 2006)
where the active volcanic nature of their territory has gen-
erally been ignored (Dóniz-Páez et al. 2011). The tourism
sector in the Canary Islands depends, essentially, on the
large international tour operators, and these companies
can and often do divert their tourist clients to destinations
considered safer or more attractive than others, and apply
pressure to get discounts when the risk level increases
(Cavlek 2002). This actually happened during the period
of volcanic unrest on Tenerife in 2004 (Martí et al. 2009).
The economic losses caused by this commercial strategy
resulted in volcanic activity being regarded as an essen-
tially prejudicial factor by the local community (Carracedo
et al. 2007). This situation was repeated in El Hierro,
where the mass media magnified the situation to make the
story more dramatic, causing anger in many residents and
some economic losses (Carracedo et al. 2012). In addition,
the current general economic crisis affecting Spain, espe-
cially the public sector, has also had a negative effect on
the island of El Hierro, where a large proportion of the
population worked in the public sector, or was financially
dependent on it, before the unrest start.
The decision-makers overreacted at the onset of
the unrest, leading to considerable expenditures being
incurred, due to:
• An evident lack of experience in some of the
scientists, public officials and decision-makers
involved (Carracedo et al. 2012).
• The type of volcanic activity expected in the
PEVOLCA was assumed to be a short-lived process,
yet the volcanic system is still active today.
• No realistic cost-benefit analysis was conducted in
advance. The PEVOLCA is a regional Emergency Plan
and it does not address the planning of evacuations
and other detailed actions that must be implemented
by the local authorities. However, at the time, these
provisions were not available, so no one had a clear
idea about the total expenditures needed for the
comprehensive management of a volcanic crisis.
There was also a change in the perception of the risk,
before and after the submarine eruption. The island of
the El Hierro island is very small (278.5 km2) and the
seismic distribution in each of the magma injection pro-
cesses moved from directly underneath the island towards
offshore sites (García et al. 2014b); consequently some
scientific groups, as well as decision-makers, thought
the probability of an eruption taking place onshore was
lower than before the onset of the submarine eruption
(October 2011). Therefore, after the submarine erup-
tion ended, in March 2012, the reaction detected in the
decision-makers was an inappropriate reluctance to take
any decision; a wait-and-see posture was adopted and
changes in the ERL, and in the warning communication
system, were delayed. This lack of actions was justified
by decision-makers saying that they not want to “cry
wolf” or to risk creating panic in response to warnings;
however, both these claimed outcomes in the communica-
tion of emergency warnings have been shown previously
to be essentially myths (Atwood and Major 1998; Mileti
and Sorensen 1990). The difficulties and lack of consen-
sus among scientific groups, described in detail below,
favored the wait-and-see posture of decision-makers with
the result that, when the last two magma injection pro-
cesses occurred (March-April 2013 and December 2013),
neither were resources sent nor were protective measures
taken before the more severe earthquakes (M 4.9 and M
5.4 respectively). Under these circumstances severe pres-
sures have been exerted on the scientific decision-making
procedures.
Volcanic activity level vs. emergency response levels
In the management of a volcanic crisis, the correct exe-
cution of scientific responsibilities and an adequate flex-
ibility in the management of the emergency may be
hampered or limited depending on how the relationship
between the Volcanic Activity/Alert Levels (VAL) and
the Emergency Response Levels (ERL) is defined in the
Emergency Plan. The VAL is one of the key sub-systems
of the Early Warning System (Basher 2006), and it is
widely used by observatories and diverse scientific groups
as a means of communication to warn the authorities
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and population about the ongoing or forecasted volcanic
activity (UNDRO 1985). In some countries the VAL only
provides information about the scientific assessment, but
in others it also includes information about appropriate
mitigation measures (Fearnley et al. 2012). In contradis-
tinction, the ERL is essentially a classification system for
emergencies in terms of administrative and operational
response, which is implemented in general and specific
Emergency Plans (York University 2011). The main cri-
teria commonly used to define the response levels are:
the severity of the expected emergency; the capacity to
handle the likely incidents with local, regional or national
resources; and the probable duration of the emergency
and recovery time. For each level of response, the ERL
defines the command structure, the resources and funds
necessary, the actions to be taken, and related matters. In
situations of volcanic risk the VALs are commonly man-
aged by scientists, whereas the ERLs are managed by Civil
Defense and governmental decision-makers, and the gen-
eral recommendation is that the two systems should be
related to each other (Bignami et al. 2012), that is, the
decisions made by decision-makers should be based not
only on the scientific information (Marzocchi et al. 2012),
and hence on the infrastructure for providing such advice
(Doswell III 2005), but also on an adequate assessment of
the threatened area and the global situation.
In the PEVOLCA, a deterministic, complicated and
poorly-defined VAL is rigidly linked to the ERL in the
same legal document (the Emergency Plan, see Table 1);
thus the scientific management of the VAL produces an
almost automatic chain-reaction, which affects the whole
emergency response system. It is inevitable, in such condi-
tions, that responsibility for the actions taken in response
to the emergency is placed on the scientists, although the
roles of the scientists and the decision-makers are clearly
different and are supposed to be separated. In addition,
the misunderstanding and deficient management of the
VTL also limits the operating scope of the Civil Defense
personnel because, according to the Emergency Plan, they
need a specific color set by decision-makers to activate the
corresponding ERL.
The three available colors of the VTL signify not the
level of volcanic activity but the general level of alert to
which the population should be reacting, whether they
should carry on as normal, just be alert, or preparing to
evacuate. The VTL is not an evaluation of the natural phe-
nomena. However, because the VTL is also linked in the
Emergency Plan to both the VAL and ERL scales (Table 1),
the VTL is understood and used by the decision-makers
as representing the scientific definition of the expected
and actual volcanic activity, as well. So the communica-
tion strategy incorporated in the PEVOLCA (Figure 1),
that is, the use of the VAL (which is always very com-
plex and difficult to manage (Fearnley 2013), for internal
communication, and the VTL for communication to the
public, is of reduced benefit because of the way in which
they are rigidly associated in the text of the Emergency
Plan. Furthermore, the legal status of the Plan document
makes it impossible to redefine the scientific risks easily
and rapidly. It has been seen that decision-makers try to
block or delay the change of VTL color from green to yel-
low due to the adverse economic impact on the tourism
sector in the island and because they want to avoid cry-
ing and wolf, generating panic in response to the warning,
and incurring large expenditures they (or some of them)
consider “unnecessary”.
Management of the Scientific Committee
In volcanic crisis management the advice will come from
several different sources, such as expert individuals, pan-
els of experts and Scientific Committees (SC) (Doyle and
Johnston 2011), although in this work we refer only to
the SC. From the point of view of the legal status, it is
in the SC where the scientific responsibilities most evi-
dently resided, since the designated role of its members
is to provide such advice (Aspinall 2011). Therefore the
Table 1 Emergency Response Level (Phase and Situation), Volcanic Activity Levels and Volcanic Traffic Light defined in
the PEVOLCA (BOC 2010) and translated into English
Phase Situation Volcanic activity levels (VAL) VTL color
Normality
Stability 1. Parameters in normal condition
Green
Pre-alert.
2. Moderate. One parameter shows anomalies
3. Moderate-increasing. One parameter shows anomalies with a clear increase of the eruptive dynamic
Pre-emergency Alert
4. Strong. Several parameters show anomalies
Yellow
5. Intense. Indicators are consistent with a pre-eruptive phase
Emergency
Max. Alert 6. Pre-eruptive phenomena
Red
1 7. The start of an eruption
2 8. The start of a major eruption
Alarm 9. Extremely violent volcanic activity
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performance of the SC is important, as well as the legal
framework in which its activities take place. In Newhall
et al. (1999) and Bignami et al. (2012) several recommen-
dations are given to improve the SC activities during a
volcanic crisis, with the object of formulating opinions to
reach at least minimum degree of consensus. However,
at the same time, these authors highlight numerous fac-
tors affecting the SC that can hamper this goal. Many of
these factors are closely interrelated, and it is not easy to
deal with them individually. The result when they act in
combination determines whether the scientific decision-
making and management can be considered a best-case
or worst-case scenario, regardless of the magnitude and
characteristics of the expected hazardous event. Some of
the most important factors have been classified here at
three operational levels: Individual, Internal and External
(Figure 2), the first two being applicable to the personnel
participating in the SC, and the third being wider issues
affecting them.
At the individual level, three groups of factors are
influential. The first is the professional skills (leader-
ship, knowledge, experience, data processing skills, etc.) of
members. Second is the capacity of SC members to com-
municate the nature of the hazards and the probabilistic
character of eruption forecasting. Thirdly, their emotional
and personal responses are also critical (for example, hon-
esty, commitment, “ownership” of a volcano, respect, and
temperament), because individuals involved in the SC will
be under great personal pressure during a period of unrest
and possible danger (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2013).
Even the health condition of the SC members must be
taken into account in such situations. The legal frame-
work is directly relevant to the individuals involved in the
decision-making process, and one result of this is that
the behavior of these people can change the expected
outcome with regard to how well the crisis is managed.
However it is very complicated to conduct research on
particular individuals in particular cases, to identify what
was said and done by whom; yet in many cases research
at the personal level is necessary to understand why today
there are still numerous failures in the DRR strategy. Not
only research but also drills and simulations can reveal
weaknesses and help to improve an emergency plan. The
analysis of risk perception by individual scientists, pub-
lic officials and decision-makers can help to detect and
predict future problems and weaknesses in the emergency
system as a whole, as well as in respect of the individuals
that comprise such a system (Donovan et al. 2014; Haynes
et al. 2008b). The research questionnaires and methods
used are also very important, as has been highlighted by
Bird (2009).
At the internal level, the way in which the SC is managed
is also very critical. This task may be the responsibil-
ity of a scientist or non-scientist, depending on the legal
framework in which the SC has been designed. In a SC
managed by a scientist, the manager or leader must con-
sider how new methodologies and techniques could be
incorporated, how the discussions are focused, and how
resources and data are organized and shared. Mediation
will be necessary between scientists; help will need to be
sought from other experts; and decisions must be made
on how the monitoring and field work are organized, etc
(Newhall et al. 1999). In a SC managed by a non-scientist,
especially if that manager lacks appropriate experience or
knowledge, the discussion of complex and detailed sci-
entific issues would not help the managers, making it
necessary to conduct the discussions in such a way that the
items being considered are easily understandable. Such a
SCmay not be competent to make decisions on important
scientific questions. In Italy a combined strategy has been
developed in which scientists are included with the Civil
Defense staff as participants in the SC (Barberi et al. 2009).
However, whatever the structure of the SC, continuous
communication between scientists, decision-makers and
Figure 2 Factors affecting the SC. The SC is an important element in scientific decision-making, but it is affected by many factors.
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public officials should exist to ensure good results (Jolly
et al. 2014; Leonard et al. 2008). Mathematical methods
using expert judgment have been used to achieve a ratio-
nal consensus in a context of uncertainty (Aspinall 2006).
These approaches have been incorporated in more com-
prehensive methodologies for hazard assessment, such as
the BET_EF and BET_VH (Marzocchi et al. 2008, 2010), in
which the Bayesian Belief Network for decision forecast-
ing can handle both discrete data and/or subjective prob-
abilities based on expert opinion (Aspinall et al. 2003).
With this approach the critical factors are not only the
calibration of the expert group (Bolger and Rowe 2014;
Cooke 2015) but also the information that will be pro-
vided by the SC to the decision-makers (Hickey and Davis
2003). Another way to reduce disagreements between sci-
entists is to focus the discussion on the eruptive scenarios
or expected outcomes rather than on interpretation of raw
data (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008). In a volcano
with frequent activity, the outcome predictions are usually
more accurate, and the interpretation of monitoring data
produces fewer differences of opinion; however, in volca-
noes with a long period of repose, there are many more
uncertainties, especially in interpreting the data. There-
fore, the discussion in the SC will be more constructive if
the focus is kept on the expected outcomes, and meetings
should also be easier to conduct. This approachwould also
minimize the possible impact due to lack of experience in
the scientists. Another critical aspect is the transparency
in the management of the SC; for instance, established
protocols should be followed, reliable meeting minutes
kept, and any agreements reached should be recorded
and communicated to the decision-makers (Newhall
et al. 1999). The quality of the advice (forecasting, haz-
ard assessment, mitigation strategies), how it is issued,
and how well-prepared the public is to receive the advice,
are important for determining not only the level of trust
(Haynes et al. 2008a), but also how the perception of risk
and the response of people and decision-makers will be
affected (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2013; Solana et al.
2008).
At the external level, described above, the risk level, the
way in which the media follow the volcanic crisis, the
human and economic situation of the threatened area, and
how the politicians perceive the situation may all serve
to increase the pressure on scientific decision-making
(Cardona 1997). However, one of the most important
factors in the definition and execution of scientific respon-
sibilities is the legal framework of the SC, which covers
important aspects like funding, selection of members,
duties, etc. Different cultures can lead to different legal
frameworks or, from a wider perspective, different ways
to deal with emergency situations (Dynes 1988; Newton
1997), sometimes even within the same country (Berke
et al. 1989). There is no single ideal solution, and the
introduction of standard and uniform methods might not
solve the problem, as has been highlighted by Fearnley
et al. (2012).
In addition to what we have already discussed, in the
particular case of the management of the SC under the
El Hierro PEVOLCA, several negative factors have been
identified. The long repose period resulted in some SC
members and public officials being notably lacking in
experience (monitoring, hazard assessment, crisis man-
agement) (Carracedo et al. 2012): the effect was that the
discussions focused on the description of the available
data, rather than the most probable scenarios, although
the latter have been partially developed very recently
(Becerril et al. 2014; Pedrazzi et al. 2014). Regrettably,
scientific discrepancies were divulged to and reported
by the media after the onset of the submarine eruption
(October-November, 2011). These scientific discrepancies
were then allowed to degenerate into personal problems,
but neither the methodology of expert elicitation nor any
other solution have yet been put into practice. Despite
the fact that a retrospective analysis can be useful for
the design and application of such methodology, when
the experts selected have known the evolution of the sys-
tem, this may introduce significant bias into the method;
thus it is always easier to implement such a methodology
retrospectively rather than in real time (Sobradelo et al.
2014).
At the internal operational level, in the case of El Hierro,
the SC is managed by a non-scientist and is still contro-
versial because there is no official record of SC meetings
(absence of approved Minutes), and committee meetings
have been increasingly delayed, i.e. the time that elapses
between the detection of a variation in the volcanic activ-
ity and the convening of a meeting of the SC has been
increasing more and more as each injection process takes
place. Discrepancies have existed between the scientific
decisions taken by the SC and the final information com-
municated to the Advisory Committee (see Figure 1),
despite the fact that some decision-makers and public offi-
cials were present at meetings of both. It seems that con-
stituting the SC within the framework of the PEVOLCA
and stipulating that the SC should be managed by politi-
cians and public officials was thought to be a strategy to
control better the scientists and scientific decisions, prob-
ably in an attempt to avoid the problems that occurred
during the 2004 Tenerife unrest (Carracedo et al. 2007).
At the external operational level, the El Hierro SC is part
of a Regional Volcanic Emergency Plan (the PEVOLCA),
which means the national Spanish Volcanic Risk Emer-
gency Plan has also its own SC, which could give rise
to a duplicated structure and contradictory decisions.
Although this situation has not yet occurred (the national
Spanish Volcanic Risk Emergency Plan was approved only
in 2013, BOE 2013), it would be expected to occur if
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the volcanic activity is extended in time. The PEVOLCA
only takes into account designated institutions rather than
named experts (BOC 2010), and these individuals have
also been changing continuously during the crisis. Hence
the limits and responsibilities of scientists are not well-
defined because of this complex legal framework.
Conclusions
When a crisis arises, the scientists and managers of
the emergency can usually identify the most important
strengths and weaknesses of the Emergency Plan (assum-
ing one exists). However, presenting and explaining these
difficulties to the wider world is a complex task. In most
cases a good understanding of many local aspects is
needed, and there are often several different points of view
about the difficulties experienced with the plan. Never-
theless, we think it is really important to review and try
to explain these difficulties if we want to improve our
knowledge, and especially if we want to avoid mistakes or
failures in the future.
Managing an emergency due to volcanic risk in an
inhabited zone is always complex, but this circumstance
is aggravated when it happens on a small island (McGuire
et al. 2009;Mèheux et al. 2007). Inevitably the whole econ-
omy of the island is always going to be adversely affected.
Nevertheless, a volcanic eruption does not necessarily
have to be a totally negative phenomenon (Kelman and
Mather 2008). El Hierro has received international atten-
tion, shown, for example, by the many times the satellite
images have been viewed (http://earthobservatory.nasa.
gov/blogs/earthmatters/2013/04/08/longshot-captures-the-
first-tournament-earth/) and the many descriptions
posted by enthusiasts on the Internet (http://earthquake-
report.com/?s=El+Hierro). However, strategies for assist-
ing local tourism marketing and local business in general
are not common in emergency plans; such strategies
should be integrated in a global approach to the emer-
gency, to mitigate the potential adverse economic effects
of a volcanic crisis in tourism areas (Zhang et al. 2009).
In many countries, the Emergency Plan is a legal doc-
ument in which responsibilities are assigned, requiring a
bureaucratic process for its formulation and approval. To
keep the flexibility of the Volcanic Emergency Plan and
to facilitate the scientific decision-making, the ERL and
VAL (and VTL, if being used), should be interrelated but
not too rigidly linked as in the case of the PEVOLCA. In
fact, the ERL does not need a direct relationship with the
VAL: for the crisis to be well-managed, the stakeholders
can make the decision about the most appropriate ERL
according to the scientific information presented. This is
a very important point for defining and delimiting the sci-
entific responsibilities. In this context, the criteria used
to establish and change the VAL will vary from one vol-
cano to another (Fearnley et al. 2012) but it must be
based on the best possible understanding of the physics
of the phenomena (Sparks 2003). According to this, and
for the scientific management of the El Hierro volcanic
process, García et al. (2014a) have used a VAL based
on the acceleration/deceleration of appropriate observ-
able metrics (cumulative seismic energy and GNSS-GPS
distances).
The correct definition and execution of scientific
responsibilities depends not only on the legal frame-
work. From the experience gained by the authors in the
El Hierro volcanic crisis, many factors could hamper
this issue. The combination of such factors could lead
to the scientific management in a volcanic crisis falling
anywhere between the best- and worst-case scenarios.
Regrettably, the El Hierro case represents a worst-case
scenario, where several factors were acting negatively: a
deficient and complex legal framework; incorrect link-
age between the VAL, VTL and ERL in the same legal
document (the Emergency Plan); scientific discrepancies
and personal problems between scientists made public by
the media; management of the SC in a non-transparent
way, etc. Put very simply, the worst-case scenario
generated in El Hierro can be attributed to three very
different general causes: the long repose period of the
volcanic activity; the unfortunate experience in the 2004
unrest in Tenerife; and problems intrinsic to the “human
factor”. Neither the appropriate forecasting process nor
the available resources have facilitated the management
of that volcanic crisis. It cannot be denied that significant
improvement is needed to achieve an effective manage-
ment of the known volcanic risk in the Canary Islands.
This is especially worrying for Tenerife, where there is a
potentially very dangerous volcano (Teide), on an island
of just over 2000 km2, in which one million people live
(García et al. 2006; Marrero et al. 2012; Martí et al. 2008;
Tárraga et al. 2008), and where no educational programs
have yet been applied.
Although this topic is very subjective, according to
our experience, the psychological profile of a scientist in
charge should have some of the following characteristics,
as has been stated before. Firstly, there are two impor-
tant personality traits, honesty and humility, which are
necessary for the individual to improve their own knowl-
edge and their ability to deal with others. Secondly, good
communication skills are vitally important. Thirdly, the
individual must have good background knowledge and
experience of the natural phenomenon to be faced, and
good capacity for working under pressure. We believe,
however, that a perfect profile does not exist, because the
effectiveness will depend not only on the individual’s psy-
chological profile and skills, but also on the environment
in which they must operate. Both aspects will be consid-
erably different in every case, wherever in the world the
emergency may arise.
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Whatever kind of emergency response system is in
place, it needs to be assessed regularly to detect vulnera-
bilities and weaknesses, from all the many different points
of view, with special emphasis not only on the legal frame-
work and the emergency plan, but also on the individuals
involved in its management. It is encouraging that cur-
rent methods and methodologies provide many solutions
to detect such problems and various ways to resolve them,
and thus eliminate them from the emergency response
system. Nevertheless, hardly any of these approaches try
to deal with these weaknesses and vulnerabilities as an
intrinsic part of the system: they offer possible solutions
that would not change the system as a whole but would
only strengthen parts of it (e.g. if an individual is the
weakness and he cannot be substituted, how should this
situation be dealt with?). If one wants to improve the DRR
strategy, then weakness and imperfection should be con-
sidered as part of the DRR system.Whatevermethodology
may be adopted to assess and detect such vulnerabilities
and weakness, it needs to combine both a global approach
and specific local measures: the former to facilitate com-
parison with other situations around the world, the latter
to take into account the local culture and way of life.
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